TO: Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye
Chair, Judicial Council of California Supreme Court of California
Comm. Judicial Appointments 350 McAllister Street, Room 1295
455 Golden Gate Ave. San Francisco, CA 94102-4797
San Francisco, CA 94102 Fax: (415) 865-7181
Fax: 415-865-4200,415-865-4205 Tani.Cantil-Sakauye@jud.ca.gov
Judge Michael Markman Chad Finke
Judge Wynne Carvill Executive Officer
Judge Kim Colwell Superior Court of Alameda County
Superior Court of Alameda County 1225 Fallon Street Room 209
Departments 1, and 511 Oakland, CA 94612
René C. Davidson Courthouse Fax: 510-891-6276
1225 Fallon Street email@example.com
Oakland CA 94612
FAX #: 510-891-5304, 510-891-6276, (510) 267-1567
Martin Hoshino Victoria B. Henley
Director Director-Chief Counsel
Judicial Council of California Commission on Judicial Performance
455 Golden Gate Avenue 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 14400
San Francisco, CA 94102-3688 San Francisco, CA 94102-3688
FAX NO. 415-865-4586 FAX NO. (415) 557-1266
Alex Tse Phyllis J. Hamilton
Director- No. District Chief District Judge
U. S. Attorney’s Office U. S. District Court- No. Division
Federal Courthouse 6th Floor Oakland Courthouse- 2
450 Golden Gate Avenue 1301 Clay Street
San Francisco, CA 94102 Oakland, CA 94612
Fax No.: (415) 436-7234 Fax No.: 415 522-3605
Faxed and Emailed
FROM: Abdul-Jalil al-Hakim
DATE: January 26, 2018
NO PAGES: 20
RE: DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE DAVID KRASHNADear Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye, Judges Grillo, Markham and Carvill, Alex Tse, Phyllis Hamilton, Ms. Henley, Mr. Finke, and Mr. Hoshino:ABDUL-JALIL al-HAKIM
Tel: (510) 394-4501
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
“JUDGE NOT LEAST YE BE JUDGED!!”
“Judge not, that ye be not judged.
For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.
And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?” Matthew 7:1-3
The Mote and the Beam is a parable of Jesus given in the Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel of Matthew,
DEFENDANT’S ADDENDUM TO STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE DAVID KRASHNA
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye Orders Change of Judge/Venue to Solano County
On Monday, January 22, 2018 the hearing scheduled on the Motions to Vacate and Set Aside Renewed Judgment and for Terminating Sanctions and other relief, and Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Subpoena, etc., in MILLER VS HAKIM, Alameda County Superior Court Case: #OCV0574030 was continued by the Chief Justice of the California State Supreme Court, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, February 8, 2018, in Dept. 511 at 9:00 a.m.
The matters before the court have been submitted to a different judge, Presiding Judge John B. Ellis, in a different venue, Solano County Superior Court, for adjudication as Alameda County Superior Court judges and administration await direction from the Chief Justice.
This essentially amounts to a Change of Judge/Venue to Solano County which al-Hakim OPPOSES because it does NOT hold the corruptors and abusers accountable for their continued actions! This is merely a inconvenient way out for them!
If Chief Justice can order a change of venue in one case that has suffered the same corruption and abuses as the others, then she should do so with the others!!
In the Dred Scott decision Chief Justice Taney wrote, blacks had been “regarded as beings of an inferior order” with “no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”
Research Attorney Phil Abar Tentative Rulings/Orders Judges Knew Nothing about Case
Four different judges, four tentative rulings with the same content, four judges that clearly knew nothing about the case! The clear pattern of abuse of process, denial due process, fraud, perjury, subverted and obstructed justice, perverted and defeated the course of justice, perverted and defeated the due administration of the laws and administration of justice, and willful misconduct while in office, where in doing so Judges Kim Colwell, Scott Patton, David Krashna, Jennifer Madden, and Wynne Carvill have already committed crimes sufficient enough declare a mistrial while committing willful blindness MUST reveal any illegal ex-parte communications and any illegal acts of collusion, and conspiracy in this case and that is under the federal statute the misprision of felony and under 18 U.S.C. Section 4 makes it a federal crime.
The responsibility existed under the Code of Judicial Ethics Rule 3E, 3E(1), 3E(2) and 4D(1) for the judges to tell the County Court about the facts of who wrote the tentative rulings and raised the defenses in the tentative ruling allegedly issued by Judges that the plaintiffs could not and did not raise themselves as a means to avoid having to rule on the issues of their 20 year continuing fraud and Elder Abuse and that is under the federal statute the misprision of a felony and under 18 U.S.C. Section 4 makes it a federal crime.
It’s a federal crime for someone who knows of a crime being committed to not tell a judge about such crime. And State court judges are bound to follow federal law under Article 6 Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
Alameda County Superior Court officers and the County Court would then be misleading and deceiving the court and the People of the State of California and actually committing obstruction of justice. So if the County Court does not come in and disclose that the County is aware of the illegal acts of the judge, the County has committed obstruction of justice. Now when the County knows that they committed these illegal acts and the judges knows that they committed these illegal acts, the two of them together have committed obstruction of justice and they have precluded al-Hakim, in the lawsuit, from obtaining a fair trial. Now that results in two things. One results in the denial of due process, in addition such action is going to be an obstruction of justice because what the County Court has done means the judiciary has obstructed justice by also denying al-Hakim a fair trial. Third, they’ve committed an extrinsic fraud upon the court and the People of The State of California because what they’ve done by having bought the court in, they’ve prevented al-Hakim from obtaining a fair trial. When together they do what is known as an outside action of stopping a litigant from obtaining a fair trial they’ve committed an extrinsic fraud because that’s something that al-Hakim really can’t find out about and it has nothing whatsoever to do with what his case is about.
If it had something to do with the proof of the case it would be considered an intrinsic fraud and it would be something that al-Hakim could prove within the confines of the case, but this is something totally outside of what is collateral to the case. So it becomes an extrinsic fraud and the cases hold that when one party does something or something happens that is outside of the case and it prevents through any means whatsoever a party getting a fair trial, that’s extrinsic fraud and that actually deprives the court of jurisdiction. And when there is no jurisdiction anything that the court does is void. This is what is happening here.
The County Court, having already displayed fraud and perjury in the service of Patton’s orders is participating in a broad conspiracy to obstruct justice, and blind obedience to a corrupt culture has serious consequences. In their corrupt attempt to shield the judge from scrutiny, these court officials brought scandal and shame to themselves, their office and the Court. These court officials decided to impede any litigation and investigation, and in doing so they should have thrown away their careers and their freedom and now being held accountable for their unlawful actions. Interference with litigation and a federal investigation cannot be tolerated as this will not allow al-Hakim or any other litigant to move forward in an environment of mutual trust with the common goal of delivering justice to litigants in collaboration with trusted partners at the County court.
By the Judge and County Court not disclosing their acts of extrinsic fraud and the cover-up, they all lacked “courage to do what is right” and they are committing obstruction of justice and should be considered for charges of racketeering and prosecuted under the RICO Act.
Judges Kim Colwell, Scott Patton, David Krashna, Jennifer Madden, and Wynne Carvill have ALL issued tentative rulings wherein clearly they did NOT craft their own rulings, in fact they knew nothing about what was in their own rulings with the research attorney writing their rulings without any editing input from them, they didn’t change even a comma from Abar’s drafts! In fact four Judges Scott Patton, David Krashna, Jennifer Madden, and Wynne Carvill have ALL issued tentative rulings with the same content formulated by Phil Abar, wherein the four judges could NOT respond to even the very basic elements of the case and refused to answer any questions regrading ANY aspect of the cases because any answers incriminates them and proves they have perjured themselves! They had NO defense nor answers to the undisputed, uncontroverted facts and evidence of their involvement in these illicit acts DOES NOT DENY THEM, JUST WANTS TO IGNORE THEM AWAY as NONE of them are allegations and conclusions unsupported by specific references to evidence!! They are ALL guilty of perjury and lying by omission!
In this very creepy and elitist legal system, where the judges don’t even read their “own” cases nor issue their “own” rulings— is corruption!
Judges have lost track of what’s in their own rulings and opinions, here’s a passage from Woodward and Armstrong’s “The Brethren”:
[A] clerk once pointed out, “You said that the right to privacy must go further than the home.”
“No,” [Thurgood] Marshall retorted. He had never said that.
Yes, the clerk insisted.
No, never, Marshall was sure. “Show me.”
The clerk brought the bound opinions.
Marshall read the relevant section.
“That’s not my opinion, that’s the opinion of [a clerk from the prior term],” he declared. Opening the volume flat, he tore the page out. “There. It’s not there now, is it?”
A judge is only as good as the research attorney or law clerk, and the same is true of the opinions that come out of the judge! These research attorneys or law clerks are NOT elite legal minds yet they are in charge of the lives of the most vulnerable of society, yet the research attorney or law clerk, was NOT elected on merit!
There is an absolute denial of justice when the person(s) passing on the merits of cases are not the judges/justices, but unappointed, unconfirmed, inexperienced, some newly-graduated people who never practiced law a day in their life.
Research attorneys and law clerks, which is essentially post-doctorate legal researchers, should NOT write court opinions, the writing and analysis should be left to the judge. It seems a massive amount of authority, power, and unfettered responsibility to be given to the, by definition, least experienced members of the profession. Even if they’re the best and brightest of the least experienced.
It suggests that court opinions involve more gamesmanship in law than applied legal knowledge gained over the course of a long career. Unfortunately that also describes the judges and their selection criteria and process!
The four judges with the same tentative ruling did NOT craft their own rulings/opinions, in fact they were clueless as to what was in their rulings with the research attorney or law clerk writing their rulings/opinions without any editing input from them, didn’t change even a comma of the clerk’s drafts! They merely FOLLOWED PHIL ABARS “SCRIPT”, read them for the first time as THEIR adopted tentative rulings on the morning of the hearings! The research attorney decided what the result would be and, what the principal ground for the rulings/opinion would be!
Today’s research attorney or law clerk only has to prove to they are “bien pensant,” and know how to functionally use “The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.” That’s why the opinions read like homogenized law review student notes – they were written by research attorneys or law clerks whose entire legal experience consisted of writing law review notes.
Someone once estimated that if a Judge read all of the petitions filed it would take him or her more than the number of waking hours in the year just to complete this task leaving no time at all for deliberating on the merits or writing opinions (or convincing other justices of the merits of the proposed opinions).
Having some secretarial help or someone to help proofread for your work is fine. Having people to read the material for you, ”make up” your opinions for you and all you do is rubber stamp the work! If it isn’t your personal work and personal opinion based on your personal qualifications to be a Judge is not acceptable.
These research attorney or law clerk are NOT writing bench memos. The bench memo itself does NOT decide the case; it is not a brief by counsel or a judicial opinion. Rather, the bench memo simply advises a judge by offering an objective review of both sides of the case. As opposed to a brief, which explores only one side’s arguments (with brief discussion of counterarguments), the bench memo summarizes and develops both sides’ arguments, recognizes the merits and drawbacks of those arguments, and recommends a course of action.
When writing a bench memo, it is important to remember to focus on the best interests of justice. The bench memo must help judges get past the advocacy of the parties’ briefs so that they can reach independent decisions.
By having these research attorney or law clerk issue rulings without the benefit of having heard any arguments in court nor observed the litigants, it lacks the appearance of fairness and voids the entire concept for a litigant who seeks to be heard by a judge whose impartiality and fairness toward him cannot reasonably be questioned.
The biases of the research attorney or law clerk is NOT available to the litigant to respond to directly as at a hearing.
In this case that fact becomes even more important as the tentative rulings issued in this case are ALL the same in a ridiculous display of ignorance and bias.
The tentative rulings states:
SUBSTANCE On 10/30/96 judgment was entered, on 8/11/06 judgment was renewed, on 7/31/07 Hakim sent a letter to the court in this case objecting to a warrant arising from an order of examination and stating “I am unfamiliar with the plaintiff and know nothing of this matter,” and on 8/1/16 the judgment was re-renewed. A party must file a motion under CCP 473(b) in 6 months, a party must generally seek relief under CCP 473(d) within two years, and a party must file a motion under CCP 473.5 within two years. This motion is well outside the permissible time frame. In addition, defendant Hakim was aware of the lawsuit as of 7/31/07 (less than one year after the judgment) but did not promptly investigate the matter and file a motion for relief. (Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 180.)
Had the research attorney (Phil Abar) whom issued the rulings had the benefit of having heard any arguments in court he would have known that his tentative rulings has made willfully, deceptive statements on the record in attempting to deceive the public in support of the rulings; implied in his tentative ruling that al-Hakim was a liar without any substance; publicly criticizing al-Hakim on the record; made knowingly false statements on the record in an effort to demean, humiliate and provoke al-Hakim; willful and prejudicial misconduct; abuse of discretion; negligence; bias; prejudice; misrepresentation; incompetence; conflict of interest; bad faith; collusion; denial of due process; obstruction of justice; racism; bigotry; has exhibited, expressed and shown a fixed opinion of al-Hakim; displayed favoritism towards the plaintiffs; made false accusations; harassed al-Hakim; has willfully, deceitfully and recklessly indulged in a series of offensive acts and statements against al-Hakim and has displayed disdain, malice, and a mental attitude or disposition toward al-Hakim that prohibits the right to a fair hearing or trial; conduct prejudicial; and advocated a judicial imprimatur of the plaintiff’s position are grounds for disqualification under Code Civ. Proc. §170.l(a)-6(B), §170.3(a)(1)-4(c), and §170.4(a)-(3); Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivisions (b) and (f), 6103 and 6106 and former rule 7-105(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct; and Cal. Code Jud. Conduct Cannons 1, 2, 2A, 2B(2), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(5) and 3B(8). Research attorney (Phil Abar) has assumed the position and authority of Judge Patton whom had to follow his script and vicariously has exhibited persistent willful misconduct, bad faith, mistreatment, promised retaliation and “atmosphere of unfairness” determines that there is a high probability he would continue his unethical behavior if he were to continue in a judicial capacity in the future violates and strikes at the heart of al-Hakim’s fundamental civil rights and due process under the law guaranteed by the United States Constitution Amendments I, V, VI, and XIV, and as applicable to this state of California Constitution by the first clause of Section 13 of Article I; Article VI, section 13, as a “miscarriage of justice.”; Article VI, section 18, subd. (d)(3)
Abar and Judge David Krashna
He states in his alleged tentative ruling “The motion of defendant Al-Hakim to compel discovery from third party JP Morgan is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”, “JP Morgan is not required to respond to Al-Hakim’s discovery requests. If, however, the debt that underlies the judgment was originally owed to JP Morgan, then Al-Hakim may serve limited and focused discovery requests to JP Morgan directly related to the existence and amount of the underlying credit card account and/or debt.”
He does NOT know that Plaintiff Bank One IS now JP Morgan Chase and there are THREE ACTIVE COURT ORDERS for them to produce the documents!
This ruling is problematic in what is the value of awarding al-Hakim the right to “serve limited and focused discovery” on Chase if the case has already been decided and there is NO need for it?
He states “The discovery sought from JP Morgan arguably relates to the claims and defenses in this case if it concerns the debt that underlies the complaint in this case.
In saying this on one hand he acknowledges that Chase IS Bank One, yet on the other denies it IS!
He states “The following third parties have filed opposition papers: Alameda County District Attorney Nancy O’Malley (10/25/17); JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA (10/25/17); Google, LLC (10/26/17); Twitter, Inc. (11/22/17).
He DID NOT KNOW there were NO timely responses to the motion to compel discovery from ANY of third party respondents and the third party that did respond only did so
AFTER the motion was filed and served, AND the unopposed reply was filed weeks later. The third parties never filed any opposition to the motion nor any privilege logs of documents they considered privileged.
Once the third parties failed and refused to respond to the motion to compel they have no right to opposed it later and MUST comply with the request.
Krashna states “The motions of defendant Al-Hakim to compel discovery from third parties are DENIED as to the Alameda County District Attorney, Google, and Twitter.”
He further states “Al-Hakim has not shown how the discovery sought from the Alameda County District Attorney, Google, and Twitter relates to the claims and defenses in this case”.
Krashna did not know this matter and the discovery sought lies at the heart of the appeal and the challenges in this case as presented by Judge Holland in his sworn affidavit. These documents ARE FOR THE APPEAL and can NOT be obtained in any other fashion.
Krashna states “The discovery sought is disproportional to the amount at issue and the importance of the issues at stake. The responding third parties have demonstrated that the discovery is unduly burdensome in light of the fact that they are third parties with no interest in the litigation.
He thought there was ONLY four third parties and DID NOT KNOW there are NINE (9) third party respondents, most of them chose NOT to respond and Krashna has NO documents to support a decision of whether the requests are ANYTHING like described in respondents untimely responses! There are 1,752 requests and he DID NOT review ONE, SINGLE requests, NO Subpoena’s nor Request for Production of Documents so HE CAN NOT POSSIBLY KNOW THAT FACT WHICH IS THE SOLE, ABSOLUTE BASIS FOR HIS DECISION!
The third parties never filed any opposition to the motion nor any privilege logs of documents they considered privileged.
The Request for Production of Documents were as follows:
Chase Request for Production of Documents is 38 pages long and contains 51 Requests;
Equinix Request for Production of Documents is 50 pages long and contains 75 Requests;
Superior Courts Request for Production of Documents is 66 pages long and contains 65 Requests;
Google Request for Production of Documents is 82 pages long and contains 146 Requests;
Judicial Council Request for Production of Documents is 67 pages long and contains 65 Requests;
Interserver Request for Production of Documents is 299 pages long and contains 152 Requests;
Alameda County District Attorney Request for Production of Documents is 251 pages long and contains 331 Requests;
Alameda County Department of Child Support Services Request for Production of Documents is 251 pages long and contains 331 Requests;
Oakland City Attorney Request for Production of Documents is 207 pages long and contains 390 Requests;
Twitter Request for Production of Documents is 87 pages long and contains 146 Requests;
As with the other three judges before him, it was quickly very clear that Judge Krashna was totally unfamiliar with case file and could not have issued the tentative ruling.
Judge Krashna didn’t know anything about case nor that it was based on plaintiff 20 years of going into court to win uncontested orders with their non-service of documents on me!
Judge Krashna didn’t know the history of non-service by plaintiffs is on record in June 2007 when the court found the service was defective yet they still went to the Sheriffs and obtained a warrant for arrest issued for my failure to appear.
Judge Krashna is trying to hide the fact he had totally exposed the fact that he did not know the existence of the one most critical motion that the entire case hinges on.
This is undeniable proof that Judge Krashna didn’t know history of this case and is simply following the order as written by research attorney Phil Abar rehashing the old “sleight of hand escape card” of “Defendant Hakim can at any time file a separate action making a collateral attack on the judgment based on lack of jurisdiction in this case and he can file an action seeking damages under federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USC 1692 et seq) and California’s Rosenthal Act (Civil Code 1788 et seq). The court expresses no opinion on the possible validity of any such action.”.
This and ALL the other issues mentioned in this declaration would have been common knowledge to any trier of fact that had even casually perused the pleadings and file! HE CLEARLY DID NOT DO SO!!!
Abar and Krashna December 13, 2017, Hearing
At the hearing on December 13, 2017, Krashna admitted that he did NOT know of the third parties in the case whom he was ruling on!
The matter was called and Krashna digressed to ask whom the other two people were that were seated in the gallery wherein they responded they were “observers”.
al-Hakim then served him the Challenge wherein he responded “Me?” I responded “yes”.
He asked where we had any previous matters and what did he do? I responded “in February 1999 you had some indiscretions that threatened my life”. He stated “that was when I was a commissioner? I said “yes”.
He began to read the challenge and commented that “it’s 22 pages so I’ll read it now”. He remained on the bench for 20 minutes reading and commented again “ you are not using the 107.6 challenge are you?” I said “it may not apply to you, but it is plead, so you should respond”
He remained there for a few minutes more than said he would go to chambers to review further and asked the clerk to “get Phil up here.”
Later a sheriffs deputy enters the courtroom and Phil follows.
It was clear that Krashna was on a mission, attempting to file an answer to the challenge so that he could achieve his agenda to dispose of the case while all the parties waited, including those attending via phone. One of the parties appearing via phone interrupted the silence to question what was going on since he had been on the phone for over 30 minutes and had NOT heard anything being said.
Krashna returned 15 minutes later.
He again asked “if the 107.6 Challenge was being made” and I responded “yes, I only mentioned it may not apply because of the 10-15 day rule, but I don’t think it applies because I have not appeared before you since 1999 and I just found out you were involved in this case late yesterday.” Krashna says “from the tentative ruling?”. I said “Yes. You might argue “timing” but I don’t think it applies because I had no earlier notice”.
He admits that he “must answer the challenge addressing several sections of the CCP and the cannons”, so he needs to continue the matter to do so. We agreed on the January 24, 2018 date.
Several third parties appeared and AFTER he had conclude the hearing, wherein one, Equinix, asked “why they were omitted from the tentative ruing?” and Krashna admitted that “he did NOT know they were involved in the case.” The ruling only mentioned three third parties when there are NINE!
He further allowed arguments both on and off the record AFTER he was served the challenge, set a new hearing date and had concluded the hearing.
He entertained specific arguments regarding al-Hakim’s “challenging judges as a litigation strategy” and third party Twitter made the requests that “the judge order al-Hakim to advise the third parties beforehand if he planned to challenge the judge that are to hear any cases.” al-Hakim objected to the continued hearing and comments as inappropriate and that the judge “should NOT be entertaining any further arguments as the hearing is concluded”.
She further asked Krashna to “have al-Hakim to just pick a judge that would be acceptable to him and the parties can agree to have the case heard before them”.
Krashna fumbles with words as he says “I don’t know about that, there shouldn’t be any discussion” but he continues as he tries to dodge the bullet by going off and on the record.
She raised the allegation that “every time they appear he challenges the judge!” al-Hakim responded again “ this is inappropriate, the hearing is over, a new hearing date set, this is in violation of the law”. Krashna says that “al-Hakim did not know I was involved in the matter until he got the tentative ruling”. al-Hakim responded again “ this is inappropriate and is in violation of the law!” Krashna says that “I am agreeing with you”. al-Hakim says “ I know that, my complaint is that her comments and this discussion is inappropriate, the hearing is over. She has appeared on two occasions, the first we appeared in court and found Judge Madden had the case and she was already recused from the case, and today we appear before you.” On both occasions I did not know whom the judges were before appearing”.
Krashna says “I agree with you”, when al-Hakim says “this is NOT a litigation strategy”
She again asked to have al-Hakim pick a judge that would be acceptable to him and the parties can agree to have the case heard before them.
Abar and Judges Criminal Acts Under the Color of Law and Authority
Abar and the judges has exhibited clear and gross examples of white class and privileged bias, prejudice, favoritism, bigotry and racism; repeatedly advocated imprimaturs of the plaintiffs litigation theory; voiced a negative and derogatory opinion of al-Hakim; portrayed al-Hakim a liar in the tentative ruling and when he could not prove it he tried to create the lie that in his sole judgment is a lie in order to justify his calling al-Hakim a “liar”; exhibited bad faith and deceit; denied al-Hakim’s civil and human rights, the rights to the truth, justice, to evidence and testimony, to due process; has had illegal ex-parte communications regarding al-Hakim even through third parties; highjacked the hearings with criminal intent under the color of law and authority in violation of the Unruh and Bane Acts. These efforts of Abar and the judges can qualify as a Hate Crime under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights and the Bane Acts, while they are clear acts of religious bigotry and intolerance for which al-Hakim will not allow. There’s no way Abar and the judges can claim to be unbiased and impartial.
Grave ethical issues are raised by the court n various forms al-Hakim has not shown any actual bias or prejudice in his treatment. The principle involved in this case is not merely one of fairness to al-Hakim but also one of maintaining respect for the law and promoting confidence in the administration of justice.  As the United States Supreme Court stated in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 [99 L. Ed. 942, 946, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625]: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. … Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 [75 S. Ct. 11, 13].”
The appearance of justice is not satisfied where the court behind closed doors have been the moving force in the transfer of this case from the assigned judge and where they have made ex parte statements which are adverse to the defendant’s interest. Due process requires that this matter be heard by a new judge.
Judge Krashna’s de facto revocation of the defendant’s right affording him due process was predicated upon the judge’s disregard of the defendant’s fundamental rights.
Judge Krashna abdicated his responsibility to protect the statutory and constitutional rights of al-Hakim in certain respects. As a matter of routine practice, the judge failed to exercise his judicial discretion to afford him due process.Judge Colwell and her court administrative staff has subverted and obstructed, perverted and defeat the course of justice, the due administration of the laws and administration of justice.
Judge Colwell and her administrative staff is guilty of manipulating the calendar, changing motions and the calendar weekly, without any pleadings nor notice! I have asked before “Why and how did this motion manage to be removed from the calendar, by who and when?
This also happened with the recent motions to compel as they were left off the calendar but mysteriously the motion to vacate and set aside the renewed judgment and the motion for terminating sanctions and other relief was placed on the calendar! On both the last two hearing dates the Case Management Conferences were also left off the calendar and tentative rulings! on 12/13/17 hearing the court will decide that motion.
The complaints involve the court Department Clerk’s administration mishandling of motions with them being mis-titled or changing the title of motions as filed, calendared unwanted motions without notice or cause, calendared motions without notice, motions being dropped from the calendar without notice, parties missing from rulings without notice or cause, parties being removed without notice or cause, changing orders, changing tentative rulings, calendaring motions that were NOT requested, posting tentative rulings AFTER the scheduled hearing time, deleting items from the register of actions, and falsifying the record (for appeal), are VERY SERIOUS threats to the Rule of Law as practiced by the acceptable courts in America! Perhaps even MORE dangerous is the silence that pervades the court when asked “Why, How and by Whom?”
I have many unanswered questions for this court and Judges Carvill, Jacobson, Rolefson, Petrou, Herbert, Markham, and Freedman, among others, that MUST be addressed regarding the continued corruption and persecution I, my family, businesses, and communities we serve continue to suffer at your individual and collective gavels.
Colwell and the Dept. 511 court clerks have entered information into the court’s computers to make it appear that the register of actions and record on appeal would not reflect what actually occurred in the cases. In some cases, the fraudulently created/altered records made it appear that certain matters had been dismissed or certain parties were NEVER apart of an action or motion.
The actions of falsifying court records had been complained of to Colwell and the presiding and supervising judges to no avail!
Given that I have had no response from the judges, nor the court administration, including Chad Finke refusing to comply with three subpoenas and request for production of documents and the Judicial Council with the same, I have no choice but to file actions with the responsible agencies to discover this information and resolve the legal concerns expressed for years.
Colwell and her Court Administration perverts or obstructs justice, or the due administration of the laws
Under section 182, subdivision (a)(5), it is a crime for two or more persons to conspire to commit any act “to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.” (Pen.Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 4570) 1 and conspiracy to pervert or obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)).
In 1950, the California Supreme Court explained the meaning of an act that perverts or obstructs justice, or the due administration of the laws:
“Generally speaking, conduct which constitutes an offense against public justice, or the administration of law includes both malfeasance and nonfeasance by an officer in connection with the administration of his public duties, and also anything done by a person in hindering or obstructing an officer in the performance of his official obligations. Such an offense was recognized at common law and generally punishable as a misdemeanor. Now, quite generally, it has been made a statutory crime and, under some circumstances, a felony.
Section 182, subdivision 5, is a more general section making punishable a conspiracy to commit any offense against public justice. The meaning of the words ‘to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws’ is easily ascertained by reference either to the common law or to the more specific crimes enumerated in part I, title . A conspiracy with or among public officials not to perform their official duty to enforce criminal laws is an obstruction of justice and an indictable offense at common law.
The Court of Appeal expanded upon Lorenson in Davis v. Superior Court (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 8 (Davis ).
In Davis, the Court of Appeal held that conduct that perverts or obstructs justice is not necessarily limited to crimes listed in part 1, title 7 of the Penal Code, nor are all crimes in that title necessarily crimes that pervert or obstruct justice:
“The reference [in Lorenson ] to ‘Crimes Against Public Justice’ does not necessarily exclude a crime not defined within the four corners of that part 1, title , of the Penal Code․ The court’s reference to such crimes was illustrative, rather than exclusionary; the type of conduct with which title  principally deals falls within the category of acts ‘to pervert or obstruct justice.’
From Davis, the Attorney General relies on the sentence, “The court’s reference to such crimes [found in part 1, title 7 of the Penal Code] was illustrative, rather than exclusionary; the type of conduct with which title  principally deals falls within the category of acts ‘to pervert or obstruct justice.’ ” (Davis, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d at p. 16.)
The court ruled in Gallegos- Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1169 (“[T]he appearance of vindictiveness results only where, as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or a punitive animus towards the defendant because he has exercised his specific legal rights.) (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373, 384). The mere appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness suffices to place the burden on the government because the doctrine of vindictive prosecution “seeks[s] to reduce or eliminate apprehension on the part of an accused” that she may be punished for exercising her rights. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d at 1369. As the district court noted, the “prophylactic” doctrine is designed, in part, “to prevent chilling the exercise of [legal] rights by other defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the future.” United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977).
Colwell and the Dept. 511 court clerks have ignored the rule of law, undermined public safety and compromised the justice system by tampering with the record have actually prevented the orderly administration of justice. As Faretta recognized, the record can only be read as an attempt to abuse the dignity of the courtroom and impugn the integrity of the rule of law as their actions “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct” (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-835, fn. 46. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581, fn. 46]) that threatens to subvert the core concept of a trial.
This scheme may have affected hundreds of cases and caused havoc in Superior Court – problems that are further complicated if the judge or clerk encouraged others to lie about the scheme.
The FBI should investigate this complaint of corruption by the judges, court administration, Colwell, the Dept. 511 court clerks and those with access to this sensitive information and hold them accountable for their actions.
There have been a litany of administrative abuses in this matter that is directly attributable to Judge Colwell and her administrative staff, altered court records to resolve an apparent inconsistency in the record, with results adverse to al-Hakim.
Colwell with administrative responsibilities adopted procedures for filings by al-Hakim that raised an appearance that he received unequal treatment based on his repeated disclosure of criminal acts by her.
Judicial Council should investigate this matter and ALL those involved should be prosecuted! There needs to be monitoring of those involved, with the publishing of the outcome of the complaint, and a report filed on the integrity of the courts adjudicatory process.
By contrast, state court judges are judicial officers, appointed by the governor or elected. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16.) They are subject to discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission). (Id., § 18.) The Commission consists of 11 members: 3 judges, appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 members of the state bar, appointed by the governor; and 6 members of the public, 2 appointed by the governor, 2 by the Senate Committee of Rules, and 2 by the Speaker of the Assembly. (Id., § 8.)
Under the Commission rules, when a written complaint is received by the Commission, the Commission may dismiss the proceeding, make an inquiry to determine whether a preliminary investigation is warranted, or make a preliminary investigation to determine whether to institute formal proceedings and hold a hearing. (Rules of Com. on Jud. Performance, rule 109(a).) If an inquiry or a preliminary investigation is commenced, the judge must be notified and be given the opportunity to respond. (Id., rules 110(a), 111(a).) If the results of the inquiry or preliminary investigation warrant it, the Commission may terminate the inquiry or preliminary investigation. (Id., rules 110(b), 111(b).) The Commission also may defer termination of the preliminary investigation in order to monitor the judge’s conduct. (Id., rule 112.) The judge has the right to be represented by counsel during all proceedings. (Id., rule 106.)
Based upon the results of the preliminary investigation, the Commission may issue the judge a notice of intended private or public admonishment. (Rules of Com. on Jud. Performance, rules 113, 115.) The judge has the opportunity to accept the intended admonishment, to object, appear before the Commission and contest the intended action, or to demand formal proceedings. (Id., rules 114, 116.) [97 Cal. App. 4th 219]
Formal proceedings must be noticed. (Rules of Com. on Jud. Performance, rule 118.) The judge is given the opportunity to file an answer. (Id., rule 119.) Discovery is permitted. (Id., rule 122.) The Commission may hear the matter itself or request that the Supreme Court appoint special masters to hear the matter and report to the Commission. (Id., rule 121.) At the hearing, the rules of evidence apply (id., rule 125), witnesses may be subpoenaed and the judge may cross-examine witnesses (id., rule 126(a)). Following the hearing, the Commission may vote to impose discipline–from private admonishment to removal of the judge. (Id., rule 134.)
The judge may petition the Supreme Court to review the Commission’s determination. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).) The Supreme Court may grant review of the determination or it may let the determination stand. (Ibid.)
Judge Krashna and Judge Colwell violate Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct
Judge Krashna’s actions along with Judge Colwell violate Canons 2 and 3 of the California Code of Judicial Conduct, which provide that a “judge should perform the duties of judicial office impartially…”
“Statutes governing disqualification for cause are intended to ensure public confidence in the judiciary and to protect the right of litigants to a fair and impartial adjudicator – not to safeguard an asserted right, privilege or preference of a judge to try or hear a particular dispute.” (Curle v. Superior Court (Gleason) (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 103.
Slanders al-Hakim to Law Enforcement
As shown above, Krashna committed prejudicial misconduct during the traffic case by expressing prejudgment of al-Hakim’s credibility. Indeed, he made the statements to the CHP officer, not simply to fulfill some ethical or judicial duty but to demean, embarrass and humiliate al-Hakim. Krashna must acknowledge that there is no excuse for his putting the unsubstantiated allegations and his opinions of al-Hakim, and that this was done in his further attempt to influence the reviewers of these documents handling of the case. By disclosing his bias against al-Hakim and his prejudgment of his credibility constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See Dodds, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at p. 176 [judge’s “prejudgment in the handling of cases . . . constituted prejudicial conduct”]; Roberts v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 739, 744-745, 748 [190 Cal. Rptr. 910, 661 P.2d 1064]; McCartney, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at p. 533 [in examining witness, judge “may not . . . become an advocate for either party or cast aspersions or ridicule upon a witness”].)
Krashna’s Deceit Under The Color of Law and Authority In Violation Of The Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights and the Bane Acts
Krashna has obviously depicted al-Hakim in statements in such a way as his fears of police misconduct and the threat for his life would be believed and as such was taken seriously. Krashna, in his effort to slaughter al-Hakim’s character, integrity, reputation and persona, convinced others of al-Hakim’s potential violence; put them on notice of his expectation of a violent outburst; then set out to provoke that outburst. This latest act of Krashna’s continued deceit as he tried to frame al-Hakim’s argument of the facts regarding the motion open discovery, “stay”, the motion to compel as burdensome without ever having seen any, not knowing if the main motion the he is supposed to be deciding is even on the calendar; exhibit bad faith and deceit; deny al-Hakim’s civil and human rights, the rights to the truth, justice, to evidence and testimony, to due process; there’s no way Krashna can claim to be unbiased and impartial.
He’s exhibited clear and gross examples of privileged bias, prejudice, favoritism, bigotry and racism; engaged in nullification of the case; repeatedly advocated imprimaturs of the plaintiffs litigation theory; voiced a negative and derogatory opinion of al-Hakim; portrayed al-Hakim a dead beat dad; has had illegal ex-parte communications regarding al-Hakim even through third parties; and highjacked the hearing with criminal intent under the color of law and authority in violation of the Unruh and Bane Acts. These efforts of Krashna can qualify as a Hate Crime under the Unruh and Ralph Civil Rights and the Bane Acts, while they are clear acts of religious bigotry and intolerance for which al-Hakim will not allow.
Krashna has made knowingly false statements in an effort to demean, humiliate and slander defendant; dishonesty; fraudulent deception; calumny deceit; willful and prejudicial misconduct; abuse of discretion; negligence; bias; prejudice; misrepresentation; incompetence; conflict of interest; bad faith; collusion; denial of due process; obstruction of justice; racism; bigotry; has exhibited, expressed and shown a fixed opinion of al-Hakim; displayed favoritism towards the plaintiffs; made false accusations; caused harassment of al-Hakim; has willfully, deceitfully and recklessly indulged in a series of offensive statements against defendant and has displayed disdain, malice, and a mental attitude or disposition toward al-Hakim that prohibits the right to a fair hearing or trial; failed and refused to respond to the allegations contained in the challenges for cause; conduct prejudicial; and advocated a judicial imprimatur of the defense’s position are grounds for disqualification under Code Civ. Proc. §170.l(a)-6(B), §170.3(a)(1)-4(c), and §170.4(a)-(3); Business and Professions Code sections 6068, subdivisions (b) and (f), 6103 and 6106 and former rule 7-105(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct; and Cal. Code Jud. Conduct Cannons 1, 2, 2A, 2B(2), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(5) and 3B(8). Judge Krashna’s persistent willful misconduct, bad faith, mistreatment, promised retaliation and “atmosphere of unfairness” determines that there is a high probability he would continue his unethical behavior if he were to continue in a judicial capacity in the future violates and strikes at the heart of al-Hakim’s fundamental civil rights and due process under the law guaranteed by the United States Constitution Amendments I, V, VI, and XIV, and as applicable to this state of California Constitution by the first clause of Section 13 of Article I; Article VI, section 13, as a “miscarriage of justice.”; Article VI, section 18, subd. (d)(3). al-Hakim is convinced that a fair and impartial trial could not be had before this judge now or in the future!
Krashna is incapable of truth, has no respect for justice, is morally bankrupt, and he will offend again.
Judge Krashna SHOULD DISQUALIFY HIMSELF
When the herein named judge fails to disqualify himself after service of this motion and after he has repeatedly lied, failed and refused to respond to the allegations contained in the challenge for cause, acted with misconduct; conduct prejudicial; racism; bias; prejudice; bad faith; suggested denial of due process; suggested obstruction of justice; preference, and favoritism displayed towards certain parties; disdain exhibited toward a party by said judge and as such; impress on those their fixed opinion and a judicial imprimatur of the defense’s position; again expressing his fixed opinion and establishing a blatant hostility and willful misconduct are grounds for removal.[re Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal. 2d 305, 312-313, 153 P.2d 734, Keating v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 440, 444, 289 P.2d 209; Briggs v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 336, 343, 10 P.2d 1103, Evans v. Superior Court (1930) 107 Cal. App. 372,
I, Abdul-Jalil al-Hakim, am the Defendant in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing written statement for the disqualification for cause of the Honorable Judge David Krashna as judge and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true. I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed this 26th day of January 2018, at Oakland, California.
Defendant in Pro Per